Introduction
In Swit�erland, the Social �e�ocratic party (SP) and the Green party are two co�petitors that have a highly si�ilar ideological profile and are located very close to each other on the left side of the political spectru�. No wonder then that citi�ens display very si�ilar probabilities to vote for either party, and that SP and Green potential voters share a nu�ber of socio-de�ographic and political characteristics (Sciarini 2010a, b) . �espite having al�ost the sa�e level and content of electoral potential, the SP and the Greens nevertheless differ strongly fro� each other with respect to their electoral strength: While the difference between the two parties narrowed in the 2007 elections, the SP's vote share still re�ains double that of the Greens. �his raises the question why voters decide for one or the other party within the sa�e electoral ca�p. �ore specifically, why do citi�ens displaying a high probability to vote for either of two parties that are ideologically close to each other end up voting for one party, rather than for the other? �he purpose of our article is to highlight the deter�inants of electoral choice for parties that belong to the sa�e party bloc and that are progra��atically al�ost identical.
Relying on the choice-set literature (�anski 1977) , which has been applied by Steenbergen and Hangartner (2008) to study electoral behaviour, we develop a two-step �odel. �he first step is known as the consideration stage, where voters evaluate the various parties in co�petition and �ake a first selection of parties that are acceptable to the�. In the second, choice stage, voters �ake their electoral choice fro� the set of alternatives selected in the first stage.
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, while several studies have deepened acade�ic knowledge about the electoral choice of parties fro� different party blocs, our study focuses on the electoral choice of parties that belong to the sa�e party bloc.
2 Swiss national elections appear to be an ideal playing field in that respect, since in the Swiss �ulti-party syste� party positions are frequently overlapping. Secondly, we innovate by using the voting propensity as a �easure of the first, consideration stage. While the voting propensity is increasingly used in electoral research, both in Swit�erland and abroad (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2005; Lut� 2006; Nicolet and Sciarini 2010a; �illie 1995; Van der Brug et al. 2007) , there is still a lively debate between those who support it and those who clai� the superiority of the classic �easure of party preferences (party choice). �o our knowledge, however, none of the existing studies has atte�pted to use the vote probability in the context of the two-step �odel, in order to study the voting decision of those voters who rate two (or �ore) parties equally high.
In the first stage, we argue that voters rely on their left-right ideological orientation to select the set of parties they �ay vote for. Now, because the SP and the Greens are ideologically so close to each other, in the second stage left voters need to resort to additional factors that are not directly linked to the left-right di�ension when �aking their electoral choice. We investigate the role played by three different sets of explanatory factors: socio-de�ographic variables, issue opinions, and strategic considerations.
�he structure of the article is as follows. In the next section we develop our theoretical argu�ent regarding the first (consideration) and the second (choice) stages of the process of electoral choice. We then present the data and turn to the e�pirical tests, starting with the consideration stage and proceeding with the choice stage. Our data ste�s fro� the 2003 and 2007 Swiss election studies, and �ore especially fro� the post-electoral, nationwide surveys that were carried out after these two elections, which provide infor�ation about voting propensities. Kitschelt's (1993 Kitschelt's ( , 1994 work offers a valuable starting point to specify the characteristics of the left electorate. Kitschelt's conception relies on the assu�ption that the political space in which parties act and in which citi�ens for� their opinions co�prises two di�ensions. �he first di�ension is econo�ic in nature, and it corresponds to the �odern translation of the old class cleavage, which gave rise to left parties in general and to social de�ocratic parties in particular, in the 19th century (Bartolini 2000) . �he second, cultural di�ension opposes libertarian to authoritarian values -or post-�aterialist to �aterialist values (Inglehart 1977 (Inglehart , 1990 .
Theoretical Framework
According to this two-di�ensional conception of politics, a citi�en can decide to support a left party because she shares the party's preferences on the econo�ic and/or on the cultural di�ension: While the working class historically opted for the political left because of its econo�ic progra��e (i.e. on issues such as redistribution, inco�e equality, social justice or state interventionis�), the new �iddle class (in particular the socio-cultural specialists), the young generations, wo�en, and highly qualified persons have �ore recently been �obili�ed �ainly because they share the left's values on the second, cultural di�ension. On their side, the Greens initially focused on voters with post-�aterialist -and �ore especially environ�ental -values, but they widened their political progra��e during the 1980s and 1990s, �oving fro� a one-issue party to a �ultiple-issue party. By so doing the Greens have progressively integrated the first, econo�ic, di�ension of politics, and they have drifted to the left of the political spectru� (�ole�al 2008; Finger and Sciarini 1991; Ladner 2008; Sciarini 1991; Vatter and Stadel�ann-Steffen 2008) . �ore recent studies have accepted the basic thrust of this two-di�en-sional conception of the political space, but they have suggested that the nature of the second di�ension has changed, �eaning that it has integrated a new line of conflict regarding the desired level of openness vs closedness of the country (Brunner and Sciarini 2002; Giugni and Sciarini 2009 ) -or, as so�e authors prefer to call it, integration vs de�arcation (Bornschier and Helbling 2005; Kriesi et al. 2006) . �he left-right di�ension, in turn, can be seen as the synthesis of the two -econo�ic and cultural -conflict lines, and opposes parties with a left-libertarian profile to parties with a right-authoritarian profile (e.g. Kriesi 1998) .
Nowadays, voters see the SP and the Greens as re�arkably close to each other on the left-right di�ension (e.g. Lachat and Selb 2005; Nicolet and Sciarini 2010b) , and as highly si�ilar in their sociological co�posi-tion and values profile (e.g. Hol�er and Linder 2003; Sciarini 2010b; Selb and Lachat 2004) . 3 In a co�parative perspective, Swit�erland is a country where the Social �e�ocrats' and the Greens' views converge �ost with respect to econo�ic policy, cultural liberalis�, and European and i��igra-tion policy, and this at the level of both the parties and their voters (�ole�al 2008) . Fro� this we derive our first hypothesis regarding the consideration stage of the voting process: given that the SP and the Greens are ideologically so close to each other, we assu�e that both parties are essentially targeting the sa�e voters, that is, voters holding si�ilar preferences on the left-right di�ension. Now, given both the high ideological proxi�ity of the Social �e�o-crats and the Greens and the high si�ilarity of their electoral potential, the persistent difference in their electoral strength is pu��ling. Because the two parties are ideologically so close to each other, the left-right di�en-sion is of little help to solve the pu��le: Potential voters will not be able to decide for which party they will eventually vote on this basis, since fro� an ideological viewpoint the two parties are equally acceptable to the�. �herefore, when left voters �ake their final choice between the SP and the Greens, they need to rely on additional criteria that are not directly linked to the left-right di�ension. �o account for the differences in the electoral choice for the Social �e�ocrats and for the Greens we wish to point to three likely explanations. �he first two factors relate to residual differences with respect to the sociological co�position and to the value profile of the Social �e�ocrats' and Greens' electorate, whereas the third pertains to strategic considerations. �hese residual differences are closely linked to the distinct historical origins and trajectories of the two parties. On the one hand, the Social �e�ocratic party is an old, established political party, with roots in the industriali�ation process in the 19th century. While the SP has updated its electoral progra��e to appeal to voters holding post-�aterialist values, it has kept strong ties with the working class and with trade unions. 4 On the other hand, the Green party is the newco�er in the Swiss party syste�. Rooted in new social �ove�ents, it has fro� the outset targeted people holding post-�aterialist and libertarian values, i.e. young generations, highly qualified people, and the new �iddle class (Seit� 2008 ). In contrast to the SP, the working class never belonged to its core constituency. In addition, the Greens' early e�phasis on gender equality has rendered the� particularly attractive to fe�ale voters (�ole�al 2008; Ladner 2008; Schneider 2008; Sciarini 2010a, b) . Further, while �e�bers and voters of the Green party certainly hold leftist preferences, recent studies show that they are �ore interested in new left values, in particular with respect to environ�ental protection, than in the traditional left, redistributive progra��e (Hol�er and Linder 2003; Ladner 2008; Sciarini 2010b) . Finally, the Greens have been �ore a�biguous than the Social �e�ocrats in their support of Swit�erland's openness to the outside world in general, and to the European Union in particular (e.g. Brunner and Sciarini 2002; Nicolet (e.g. Brunner and Sciarini 2002; Nicolet and Sciarini 2010b) .
Based on these differences between the two parties fro� the perspective of their sociological and value profile we for�ulate a first set of hypotheses regarding the choice stage. First, a�ong left potential voters the difference in party choice between the Social �e�ocrats and the Greens is expected to vary as a function of age, education and gender. �ore specifically, we assu�e that the likelihood to vote for the Social �e�ocrats rather than for the Greens increases with age (Hypothesis 2a) and decreases with the level of education (Hypothesis 2b), that it is higher a�ong �en than a�ong wo�en (Hypothesis 2c), and also higher a�ong trade union �e�-bers (Hypothesis 2d).
5 Secondly, we posit that a�ong potential left voters the likelihood to vote for the Social �e�ocrats rather than for the Greens varies as a function of preferences on various issue di�ensions. �he Social �e�ocrats still �obili�e on the classical econo�ic (redistributive) di�ension, and should thus be attractive to voters with a strong preference for state intervention (Hypothesis 3a). On its side, the Green party stands first of all for ecology and is expected to be especially attractive on this issue (Hypothesis 3b). Finally, the Social �e�ocrats have supported international openness earlier and less a�biguously than the Greens and are, therefore, likely to benefit �ore fro� the openness-related issue (Hypothesis 3c). 6 �hirdly, we assu�e that strategic considerations are significant in explaining the difference in electoral choice for the SP and for the Greens -and, therefore, for the greater electoral success of the for�er over the latter. �he per�issiveness of the electoral syste� is the usual suspect, that is, the typical institution that is supposed to affect the electoral choice. In the case of the National Council elections, a district-based proportional representation syste� (PR) applies, except in the six s�allest cantons, where a �ajoritarian syste� applies. However, in PR contests district �agnitude varies fro� 2 to 34 seats, which �ay affect the electoral choice. �ore specifically, we assu�e that in s�all cantons with few seats, left voters are likely to cast a "useful" vote and opt for the Social �e�ocrats, fearing that their vote �ight be lost if they vote for a party (the Greens) that �ight prove unable to reach the natural threshold (Hypothesis 4).
Data and Operationalization
Our data co�e fro� the 2003 and 2007 Swiss election studies. In both years, a sa�ple of Swiss citi�ens was interviewed in the after�ath of the national elections. Besides questions �easuring voting propensities and voting choices (our two dependent variables; see below), we also use socio-de�ographic characteristics, self-position on the left-right scale and parties perceived position on the sa�e scale, and opinions on political issues. Regarding the last issue, our indicator of the econo�ic di�ension �easures whether the respondents support an increase (or a decrease) of taxes on high inco�e. As an indicator of values on the new, cultural di�ension we first use a question regarding ecology, which asks the sa�ple whether it favours the deco��issioning (or not) of nuclear plants. Secondly, we resort to a �easure of preferences on the openness-closedness conflict line, and �ore specifically on whether Swit�erland should join the EU or stay outside. Issue preferences are �easured on five-value scales (ranging fro� 1 to 5, with "neither-nor" as the inter�ediary position (3)). �escriptive statistics of the independent variables are provided in the Appendix. Figure 1 confir�s that the SP and the Greens are seen as ideologically highly si�ilar by Swiss voters: In 2003, the respondents of the post-electoral survey positioned both parties at exactly the sa�e point (3.0) on an 11-point left-right scale (0 to 10); four years later, the SP �oved 0.1 points to the left, whereas the Greens �oved 0.2 points to the right. Si�ilarly, Figure 2 shows that in both 2003 and 2007 �ore than 50% of the electorate locates the SP and the Greens either on exactly the sa�e position on the left-right scale, or at only one point of distance; the share reaches 76% if we include respondents who locate the SP and the Greens with a two-point distance.
Consideration Stage
According to the choice-set literature, in the consideration stage voters apply a s�all nu�ber of criteria in order to eli�inate so�e of the �any voting alternatives (Steenbergen and Hangartner 2008: 4) . �he probability of future vote (or "voting propensity") reflects the idea that in the consideration stage voters pre-select a set of parties that they �ight vote for. �hat is, the variable represents very well the set of all parties that voters �ay consider as being eligible -possibly including parties that do not co�pete in the electoral district 7 -before voting for their favourite party, or deciding to �ake a strategic vote. Voting propensities have been understood in the literature as a �easure of electoral utilities (�illie 1995; Van der Eijk et al. 2006 , and �any others). In the present article we use the� to operationali�e the first, consideration stage of electoral choice.
�he 2003 and 2007 surveys include a question on voting propensities: For each of the �ost i�portant Swiss political parties, respondents were asked to evaluate, on the 0 to 10 scale, the likelihood that they �ight vote for a given party in the future. As �able 1 clearly shows, there is a strong overlap of voting propensities for the Social �e�ocrats and for the Greens in Swit�erland, and this both at low and high levels of voting propensities.
In 2007 one third (32%) of the electorate displays exactly the sa�e probability to vote for the Social �e�ocrats as for the Greens (last colu�n); an additional 36% of the electorate displays a highly si�ilar voting propensity for both parties (difference of one or two points on the 11-point scale). �his result also holds when focusing on voters with a high voting propensity for SP or Greens (i.e. on voters with a �axi�al voting propensity for SP or Greens equal or greater than 8): 24% of these voters have the sa�e voting propensity for both parties, and an additional 35% have a highly si�ilar voting propensity. 7 �he open character of this question is reflected by the fact that the average voting propensity of the Greens is only slightly lower in cantons where they did not co�pete in elections than in cantons where they did. Si�ilarly, �issing cases are only �arginally higher in the for�er cantons.
8 While the position of other parties, especially the Christian �e�ocrats (CVP) and the Liberals (F�P), also overlap on the left-right axis, these two parties have a fairly different electoral potential: A�ong those voters who express a very high propensity to vote CVP or F�P (80% or �ore), only 29% express a si�ilar voting propensity (difference of up to two Given their ideological proxi�ity the large overlap between SP and Greens voting propensities should not co�e as a surprise. Our �odelling of the consideration stage takes this into account, and posits that the voting propensities for the five largest Swiss parties (CVP, F�P, Greens, SP, and SVP) is accounted for by the voters self-location on the left-right axis and by their perception of parties location on the sa�e scale. �he self-location of a given voter is noted as LR R , whereas LR p stands for the left-right location of party p according to that voter's perception. 9 Our spatial �odel explains the voting propensities of a voter with the distance between her own position and the perceived party position on the left-right axis:
10 Voting points) for both parties. propensity should drop as the spatial distance with a party increases. We �odel this expectation as a function of the squared distance between the voters self-location and the parties location (LR R -LR p )
2 . In addition, we further include party-specific du��y variables for each party Δ p controlling for the possibility that certain parties are per se �ore acceptable to voters than others, and we interact these variables with the squared distance, since for so�e parties the left-right positioning �ight be �ore i�portant than for others. Hence, our spatial �odel of the voting propensities vp looks as follows.
Acknowledging that the error ter�s of the voting propensities �ight be correlated across parties, we e�ploy a seemingly unrelated regression �odel for �etrically scaled dependent variables, which allows the inclusion of several dependent variables that are not independent fro� each other. Our five related dependent variables are the voting propensities for Figure 3 . In line with our first hypothesis all �odels of �able 2 show that with increasing distance fro� a given party on the left-right axis the voting propensity for that party drops. However, there are so�e differences across parties. �ost i�portantly, at si�ilar distance fro� the Greens on the left-right axis voting propensities for this party increased between 2003 and 2007, whereas an opposite trend holds for the Social �e�ocrats: At a si�ilar distance fro� the Social �e�ocrats voting propensities for this party decreased. And while in 2003 voters showed a higher probability to vote for Social �e�ocrats than Greens, this difference vanished by 2007. We also see that the left-right di�ension is especially relevant to explain voting propensities for the left-wing (SP, Greens) and right-wing parties (SVP), but less so for the centre-right parties (CVP, F�P).
Choice Stage
Fro� the previous section we know that the Social �e�ocrats and the Greens are both equally successful with respect to voting propensities, and ideologically hardly distinguishable for the voters. Now, voters holding a high voting propensity for a specific party do not necessarily end up voting for that party. For instance, out of the 23% of the individuals with a high (equal or greater than 80%) propensity to vote for the Greens, only 13% (in 2003) and 19% (in 2007) voted for the Greens, whereas 30% in 2003 (25% in 2007) voted SP. Si�ilarly, voters who rate the Social �e�ocrats and the Greens as the �ost viable options in their consideration stage will not auto�atically vote for either party. �hey �ay abstain or vote for another party. �his is typically the case when the criteria that voters use in the choice stage are not speaking for either, or both, left-wing parties. In other words, a high voting propensity for a given party is not a sufficient condition to vote for that party. It is, however, a necessary condition: In both election years, 99% of Green voters indicated a high voting propensity (equal or greater than 50%) for the Greens; the corresponding figure is 95% for the SP.
In the second, choice step of the �odel, voters �ake their decision fro� the set of parties that are acceptable to the�. Accordingly, we consider all voters with a high potential to vote for SP and Greens, that is, all voters who selected both SP and Greens in the consideration stage, and face the dile��a of choosing between either party. Our case selection for the second stage follows the idea of earlier studies that have used voting propensities to esti�ate the aggregate electoral potential of a political party (Kriesi et al. 2005; Sciarini 2010a ). �hese studies have assu�ed that the potential to vote for a certain party is a linear transfor�ation of the voting propensity, and voters who indicate a voting propensity of 9 out of 10 points can be counted as voters with a 90% potential to vote for a certain party. We adopt this logic, but �ove to the individual level of analysis: �o identify the potential SP and Greens voters, we count every voter to the degree that she indicates that she �ight possibly vote for these parties, i.e. we weight voters according to their voting propensity for these parties. �ore specifically, as a weighting factor we use the product of the propensities to vote for the SP and for the Greens. Consequently, voters with a voting pro- pensity of 1 for both parties will be weighted to 100%, those with a voting propensity of 0.9 for a party and 0.8 for the other will be weighted to 72%, those with a voting propensity of 0.2 for each party will be weighted 4%, etc., whereas voters with a voting propensity of 0 for SP and/or Greens will be excluded fro� the analysis. Voters with a �axi�al voting propensity (100%) correspond best to our idea of voters who need to �ake a decision for either party in the second stage. But voters with high propensities for both parties also belong (albeit to a lower degree) to the set of voters who face a dile��a between SP and Greens. In su�, this weighting procedure enables us both to focus on voters with high voting propensities for both parties, and to avoid resorting to an arbitrary cut-off point to select potential left-wing voters.
Unsurprisingly, our selection results in a set of voters who are �ore likely to vote for SP or Greens than are average voters (�able 3): �he non-selective sa�ple includes all voters (only weighted by participation ; the selective sa�ple only includes those voters who have been identified as the potential voters for SP and Greens. While in the selective sa�ple abstainers are still the largest group of voters, the chances of potential left voters to finally cast their vote for SP or Greens are nevertheless considerably higher than in the whole sa�ple. 13 �able 4 presents the results of a �ultino�ial logit �odel in which the electoral choice is regressed on the three sets of explanatory variables discussed in the theoretical section, and using the vote for the SP as the reference category; 14 we also include interaction ter�s between the year du��y (2007) and all independent variables, which infor� about the evolution of their effect between 2003 and 2007.
We first see that the explained variance of our choice stage �odel is fairly low, with a R 2 of roughly 12%. �his is hardly surprising. We cannot expect a high explanatory power in a �odel that looks for explanations of electoral decisions on two parties that belong to the sa�e political bloc; this electoral choice concerns voters who -according to the strongly correlating voting propensities -are a�biguous with respect to their decision to vote for one party or the other. 15 Besides, results of �ultino�ial logits 14 �o check for a possible violation of the assu�ption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), repeated Haus�an and S�all-Hsiao tests were conducted for the �ultino�ial logit �odels. �he Haus�an test indicates that the IIA alternative is not violated; S�all-Hsiao tests, however, suggest that the assu�ption is violated. �herefore, we also ran �ulti-no�ial probit �odels (see Appendix). 15 An alternative would be to look at the "panachage" vote. In all cantons with PR-syste�s, voters have the opportunity to give so�e of their personal preference votes to candidates of other parties; this "panachage" vote �ight resolve the dile��a that they face when choosing between two si�ilar parties. Additional tests, not reported here, show that in both election years, one voter out of five who voted for the SP also gave votes to the Greens; the corresponding figure is even higher a�ong voters who gave their first vote to the Greens (roughly one out of three also gave votes to the SP). �ost of the explanatory variables in our �odel locate SP-Green panachage voters so�ewhere in the �iddle between SP and Green voters. However, there is a general rule (also valid for other parties) that highly educated voters are the �ost likely to use the panachage vote. or probits are difficult to grasp based on coefficients, all the �ore so since our �odel includes several interaction ter�s. �herefore, we also rely on graphical presentations of the results. Figure  4 shows the relationship between age and electoral choice, with all other variables held constant at their �ean or at their �edian value. We first see that a�ong SP and Greens potential voters the likelihood to abstain substantially decreases with age: Old voters were less likely than young voters to abstain in 2003, and especially in 2007. Secondly, the vote for the SP and for other parties, except the Greens, increases as a function of age. 16 In other words, rather than abstaining, older voters belonging to the further decrease the si�e of the categories of our dependent variable. For these reasons we chose to focus on the first vote that was expressed in the survey.
16 �he results �ight generally see� rather low for SP and Greens, because all other variables are set at their �ean (�edian for the issue questions). But in case of skewed distributions of other variables, this �ight result in rather low values in this figure. electoral potential of the left tended to vote for the Social �e�ocrats, or for other parties, but not for the Greens. �he Greens were only successful in �obili�ing young potential voters. In fact, a�ong young voters the Greens perfor�ed as well as the SP, especially in 2007. In su�, Figure 4 confir�s our hypothesis 2a that a�ong potential left voters the difference in party choice in favour of the SP (over the Greens) increases with age. �he strong link of older voters to the SP and to other parties contributes to the explanation of why the Greens score below their electoral potential. �his, together with the fact that turnout is far higher a�ong older voters than a�ong young voters, offers a first explanation of the persistent difference in electoral success between the SP and the Greens. �he likelihood of abstaining decreases significantly as a function of education (�able 4). In spite of their high propensity to vote for left parties, voters with a low level of education �assively abstained; on their side, voters with a higher level of education were �ore likely to vote for SP, Greens, or for other parties. �his effect beco�es even stronger in 2007 than in 2003. We cannot, however, confir� our hypothesis 2b regarding the differences in electoral success between the SP and the Greens, since in co�parative ter�s the latter did not perfor� better than the for�er a�ong highly educated persons. Si�ilarly, gender cannot contribute to the explanation of difference in electoral success between the SP and the Greens, since both parties suffered about equally fro� a low level of �obili�ation a�ong wo�en. Hypothesis 2c is thus not confir�ed.
In the second �odel of �able 4 we include a �easure of union �e�ber-ship, which turns out to be a significant predictor of the SP vote: In line with our hypothesis 2d, potential left voters who belong to a trade union abstain less and vote �ore for the SP than for the Greens or for other parties. At first glance, the inclusion of the union �e�bership variable increases the explanatory power of the �odel substantially, and it also changes the i�pact of individual variables. However, this result is �ainly due to the drop in the nu�ber of observations: In the 2007 survey the question about union �e�bership was included in a separate, written questionnaire that was returned by only a s�all and selective sa�ple of voters. �his heavily affects several of our variables, and results of the second �odel should be considered with caution. 17 17 Si�ilarly, the differences between the two elections are an artefact of the selective sa�-ple in 2007. We have replicated the first �odel for the sa�e cases included in the third �odel. �his leads to an increase of the explanatory power to 0.1369, and the coefficients and standard errors for all variables, except for the gender variable, al�ost exactly corre- We now turn to the effects of our three issue conflicts, starting with the classic, redistributive conflict over taxes ( Figure 5 ). �he likelihood of voting for Social �e�ocrats and Greens strongly varies according to one's preference with respect to taxes on high inco�e. A�ong left potential voters who strongly oppose such taxes the predicted probability to vote for the SP is lower than 10%; a�ong respondents who strongly support SP and Greens this probability a�ounts to 30%. As �able 4 and Figure 5 show, a si�ilar effect also holds for the Greens. Against our Hypothesis 3a, the taxation issue thus does not �ake any difference in the conversion rate between SP and Greens.
�he SP could attract significantly �ore voters than the Greens (and even �ore so than the other parties) thanks to its positive stance towards EU �e�bership (Figure 6 and �able 4) . 18 Left, pro-European voters are �ore than three ti�es �ore likely in 2003, and al�ost four ti�es �ore spond to the third �odel. 18 In the dataset that we used, the scale for the EU integration issue has been recoded, and ranges fro� 0 to 1. likely in 2007, to vote for the SP, than anti-European voters. For the Green party, the pro-EU effect is �uch weaker. �his result confir�s our hypothesis 3b, and provides an additional explanation of the difference in electoral success between the SP and the Greens, especially given that a �ajority of voters in our sa�ple supports EU �e�bership. �he Greens have been �ore a�bivalent than the SP with respect to EU �e�bership, and they see� to still pay a price for this a�bivalent attitude. Finally, Figure 7 shows that rejection of nuclear energy increases the probability that potential SP / Greens voters will actually vote for these parties, rather than for other parties. In 2003, the Greens benefited especially strongly fro� the vote of potential left-wing voters with pro-ecology preference, but the difference between the two parties vanished in 2007 (see �able 4). In other words, the ecological issue helped the voters to �ake a choice between SP and Greens in 2003, but not so in 2007. �his thus leads to only a partial confir�ation of our hypothesis 3c that the Greens should be the �ain beneficiaries of ecological values.
Our fourth and last hypothesis regarding the difference in electoral success between the SP and the Greens relates to the role of political institu- tions, and �ore especially of the per�issiveness of the electoral syste�. �o test this hypothesis we have included a (logarith�ised) �easure of district �agnitude in our esti�ations (see �able 4, �odel 3). However, this variable has no effect whatsoever, if we focus on those cantons where both the Green party and the Social �e�ocrats were running for election. It has a statistically significant effect if all cantons are included, but this effect is �eaningless. It is only due to the fact that in �any cantons voters do not have any choice; they si�ply cannot vote for the Greens, since the latter do not run for election. �his suggests that there is no i�pact of district �agnitude on the de�and side (voter behaviour), once we control for the self-selection process of political parties, which present lists only in cantons where they have a good chance to reach the district threshold (Hug 2003 (Selb and Pituctin 2009) . As an alternative explanation for the absence of i�pact of the electoral syste� one can point to the counterrole played by list apparentments: In all cantons where both Green party lists and the Social �e�ocrats were running, they had concluded a list apparentment, so that votes cast for a non-successful party were transferred to the allied party. Under such circu�stances, Green voters did not have co�pelling reasons to defect and to vote for the SP (Bochsler 2010) .
Conclusion
In this article we have addressed a question on which the existing literature is �ostly silent: how do voters �ake their intra-bloc decision, that is, how do they eventually opt for a party fro� a larger set of parties they �ay equally vote for. Such a situation depicts a scenario where at least two parties share a very si�ilar political profile and hence ca�paign for essentially the sa�e voters, and where these voters have to find so�e sort of cues to �ake their electoral choice. We have argued that the probability of future vote that is extensively used in electoral research as a �easure of voting propensities actually fits quite well with the theoretical �odel of electoral choice on which we rely in this article, na�ely the two-step �odel. In the first, consideration stage voters evaluate which parties they �ay possibly vote for. �his is �easured through the voting propensities indicated by the voters, and results in a pool of potential voters of left-wing parties, that is, of voters who include E�pirically, we used a spatial �odel to account for the consideration stage. In line with our first hypothesis, the distance between voters selflocation on the left-right di�ension and their perceived location of a given party on the sa�e di�ension appears as a consistent predictor of voting propensities. We then looked �ore closely at potential SP and Greens voters, as identified by their voting propensities, and analysed this selective sa�ple in the second, choice stage of the electoral process. In the present context, the choice stage turns out to be especially delicate for left-wing voters, because Social �e�ocrats and Greens are ideologically so si�ilar and are located so close on the left-right di�ension that there is hardly any co�pelling reason to vote for one party rather than for the other. �ifferenc-es between the two parties are residual and concern so�e specific aspects such as the newness of the Greens and their special concern for libertarian issues, or, conversely, the persistent links between the SP and trade unions, or its resilient appeal to voters sensitive to redistributive issues. We have for�ulated hypotheses along these lines, as an atte�pt to solve what appears to be a genuine pu��le: why are the Greens still lagging so strongly behind the Social �e�ocrats with respect to electoral strength, while according to vote probabilities they are as popular as their left co�-petitor? E�pirical tests have provided encouraging support for so�e of our hypotheses and, therefore, �ake a contribution to solving the pu��le.
�he conversion of potential left-wing voters into real voters increases with age for the Social �e�ocrats, whereas it decreases with age for the Greens. �his, together with the substantially higher turnout a�ong older voters, accounts for the difference in electoral success between the SP and the Greens. Si�ilarly, as co�pared to the Greens, the SP still benefits fro� its close links with trade unions: Potential left voters that belong to a trade union vote significantly �ore for the SP than for the Greens (or for other parties). Si�ilarly, issue preferences on the openness -closedness di�en-sion, as �easured by individual attitudes towards EU �e�bership, are influential. �ore specifically, the likelihood of eventually voting for the SP increases substantially as one �oves fro� anti-to pro-EU attitudes. By contrast, gender and education do not contribute to the explanation of the difference in electoral success between the two parties, nor do preferences on the econo�ic, redistributive issue and opinions on nuclear energy (in 2007). Finally, the per�issiveness of the electoral syste� does not play any role at the choice stage, but only �atters on the offer side.
�he analysis also infor�s us about those voters who have the SP or the Greens in their choice set, but eventually decide not to vote for either party. We found that young people, voters with low education levels, but also those with opinions that oppose left-wing parties' preferences on political issues, especially regarding EU integration, were �ore likely to abstain. Preferences that are in conflict with the SP or Green positions on any of the issues under study also result in a higher probability to vote for another party.
In su�, our findings contribute to the explanation of the persisting difference in success between the Greens and the SP, with the latter taking advantage of its higher conversion rates a�ong older voters, trade union �e�bers and EU supporters. �he fact that the explanatory power of our choice stage �odel is fairly low does not �ean that our conception is wrong or that our �odel is not correctly specified. Instead, we wish to e�phasi�e once again that explaining intra-bloc electoral choice is by definition a delicate endeavour. Given this, our e�pirical findings are indeed pro�ising. Alors que la littérature existante s'est essentielle�ent intéressée au vote pour les partis appartenant à différents blocs politiques, l'objectif de cet article est d'étudier le vote pour deux partis qui sont idéologique�ent très proches l'un de l'autre, le Parti socialiste suisse et les Verts. A cette fin, nous développons un �odèle à deux étapes, dans lequel les votants sélectionnent d'abord les partis qui leur se�blent acceptables et choisissent ensuite sur cette base le parti pour lequel voter. Nous utilisons la probabilité de vote co��e �esure de la pre�ière étape et nous �ontrons que cette probabilité dépend forte�ent de la distance entre les votants et les partis sur une échelle gauche-droite. S'agissant de la deuxiè�e étape, celle du choix électoral, nous for�ulons S'agissant de la deuxiè�e étape, celle du choix électoral, nous for�ulons plusieurs hypothèses relatives aux facteurs susceptibles d'expliquer la capacité variable des deux partis à convertir leurs électeurs potentiels en électeurs réels. Les tests e�piriques soulignent l'i�pact des facteurs socio-dé�ographiques et du vote d'enjeu. En revanche, les considérations stratégiques ne se�blent pas jouer de rôle. 
